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Mr. Fey's article should help to combat much of the
unjustified criticism of the United States Supreme Court
which the prior article has established to be based upon
ignorance of operational aspects.
THE SUPREME COURT-
AN OPERATIONAL SURVEY
JOHN T. FEY*
T HE POSITION OF the Supreme Court in the Government of the United
States is largely a product of our federal system. An understanding
of that system provides added insight in considering the extent to which
the Supreme Court has fulfilled its function. The nature of the Court's
undertaking and the form of our government precede the Constitutional
Convention by 144 years. American federalism had its birth in the
dangers of the frontier and in the community of interest in establishing
security in a new world. This community of interest and unity of purpose
was first exemplified in the articles of Firm and Perpetual League of
Friendship, entered into in 1643 among the jurisdictions of Massa-
chusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven. These articles can
be viewed as the basis for the Continental Congress and the Articles of
Confederation.
The unification of our colonies and the development of a federal
system was, by necessity, a rapid development. The temporary confed-
eration of the thirteen colonies bound together to wage a war for
independence was an unlikely basis for continuing national unity. It was
obvious that the only possible solution was union in a federal consti-
tutional system. Such a system had much to offer the members of the
confederation which insisted on a continuing independence and sov-
ereignty in order that the real differences in economic, social, and political
views of their citizens could be represented. Such a system offered a
federal government to provide for the general welfare of the people of
the colonies, and state governments to supply local and more specific
needs. The result was a Federal Constitution which provided that there
should be reserved to the states those powers not delegated to the federal
government. Upon this basic division of governmental authority, a dual
legal system was conceived which derives its authority from the nation
and states respectively.
In our federal system, it is fundamental that the federal government
possesses only those powers which are expressly delegated to it by the
* M.B.A., Harvard University; LL.B., University of Maryland. Clerk of the United
States Supreme Court. Former Dean, George Washington University Law School.
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Federal Constitution and those implied
powers that are necessary and proper in
the execution of the express powers. The
remaining powers reside in the states and
are exercised under independent state con-
stitutions which are generally patterned
after the federal model. With this form of
dual government, it is not only essential
that there be explicit provisions written into
the Constitution, but also that there be an
arbiter to resolve the normal conflicts which
are to be expected. This function of arbiter
is exercised by the judiciary, providing
through its decisions the constitutional law
of the land.
Formation of the Court
The fathers of the Constitution, sitting
at the Federal Convention of 1787, gave
long and careful consideration to the char-
acter of the courts required by our federal
system. At all times they were in unanimous
agreement that there should be a federal
judicial power with at least one tribunal to
exercise that power. In the course of their
deliberations varying plans were presented,
with each plan including one or more su-
preme tribunals. On May 29, 1787, the
Randolph Plan was presented proposing
that ". . . a National Judiciary be estab-
lished; to consist of one or more supreme
tribunals .... ."1 On the same day, Pinckney
submitted a plan providing that Congress
was to establish such courts of law, equity,
and admiralty as shall be necessary, and
that one of these courts was to be termed
"The Supreme Court."'2 The Patterson
Plan, which was presented two weeks later,
provided that "... a federal Judiciary be
1 MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 62 (1893).
2 Id. at 70.
established, to consist of a supreme Tri-
bunal .... ,,3 And finally, Alexander
Hamilton proposed that the supreme judicial
authority of the United States should be
vested in a number of judges. 4 It did not
require extended debate for the convention
to arrive at the conclusion that there should
be one supreme tribunal rather than one or
more as proposed by Randolph. The final
constitutional provision was that "The ju-
dicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior courts as the Congress may, from
time to time, ordain and establish."5 Thus
it was that the judicial power at the top
of the federal system was conceived as "one
Supreme Court" which, under the philoso-
phy of the framers of the Constitution,
was to function as a unit. It is pursuant to
this principle that each action of the Su-
preme Court is the action of all of the
justices and not of divisions of the Court.
An Independent Judiciary
There was early agreement on the princi-
ple that the judiciary of the federal courts
should be independent of political or eco-
nomic influence. The wisdom of such inde-
pendence was partly derived from the un-
fortunate experiences of the English courts
under George III. George had relegated
the British judges to complete dependence
upon his will for their tenure of office and
for salaries. The members of the conven-
tion were also able to draw upon the experi-
ence of the states, some of which had
failed to provide for the independence of
their judges. The experience of some states
with elected judges had been unfortunate
and the position of judge had become de-
3 Id. at 165.
4 Id. at 186.
5 U.S. Const. art lIt, § 1.
pendent upon political successes. With these
experiences before them, the framers of
the Constitution were determined to pro-
tect the independence of the federal courts,
and they did so by providing for life
tenure and by a provision that judicial sal-
aries ". . . shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office."' Supplementary
to these constitutional provisions, recent
legislation provides that a justice who has
served ten years and has reached the age
of seventy may retire on full salary, at his
sole discretion. These provisions, along
with the benefits for the widows of justices,
have placed members of the Court in ab-
solutely secure positions which they may
hold for life without political influence,
either legislative or executive.
The Growth of the Court
When the Supreme Court was formed in
1789 with a chief justice and four associate
justices, it was a Court without the benefit
of American case law and with only the
guideposts of constitutional provisions by
which it was to steer the course of con-
stitutional developmenti
The Judiciary Act of 1789, 7 among
other provisions, established the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court to review final
judgments of state courts in cases involving
a federal question. Although the act set
forth this express power over the acts of
state courts, there was no such express pro-
vision for the review of federal legislation.
It was not until the case of Marbury v.
Madisons that the Supreme Court deter-
mined that this power existed and that it
was to determine the validity of federal
legislation against the background of the
Constitution.
Ibid.
7 I STAT. 73 (1789).
85 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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One of the first decisions which the
Court was called upon to make was that of
determining its jurisdiction and the law
which was to be applied to the criminal cases
presented. In the cases of United States v.
Hudson and Goodwin9 and United States
v. Coolidge,1 the Court determined that it
had no common-law criminal jurisdiction
in the absence of congressional action.
A second problem was that of determin-
ing the law applicable in federal civil cases.
In both federal and state cases there de-
veloped what might be referred to as a
general federal common law. For many
years the principles of Swift v. Tyson1 pre-
vailed and, in the absence of statute, the
Supreme Court determined the law which
should be applied to the case before it,
not being bound by the common law of the
state which was involved. In 1938, the case
of Erie R. R. Company v. Tompkins t2 over-
ruled the principle of Swift v. Tyson, hold-
ing that in substantive matters the common
law of the state should be applied in cases
which did not involve a federal question.
At the same time that Erie R. R. Company
v. Tompkins was being decided, Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in the case of Hinderlider v. La
Plata Company,13 made reference to the
existence of the "federal common law"
upon which neither the statutes nor the
decisions of any state can be conclusive.
Thus, there was a recognition of the exis-
tence of a common law on federal questions,
necessitated by the federal government's
interest in the controversy.
During the period outlined above, it
was inevitable that the Court should come
into conflict with the other branches of
') 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
10 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 415 (1816).
11 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
12 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
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government. Throughout the history of the
Court there have been recurrent attacks
upon the authority of the Supreme Court.
From the executive branch of government,
it has been subjected to the strong criti-
cism of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Such executive criti-
cism was brought forth in situations
where the executive believed that the Court
was entering into political realms. Without
reviewing the basis of the various contro-
versies it should be sufficient to recognize
that the Court, by necessity, must make
decisions which have an impact upon the
political structure of the American system
of government. This is required by the fact
that the Constitution, which it is charged
to interpret, is the instrument which de-
fines the political framework of our govern-
ment. Any judicial interpretation of the
political otitline of government must run
the risk of arousing executive or legislative
criticism. Such a reaction is to be expected
when the power of either body is subjected
to limitations by judicial construction.
Thte history of the Court is filled with
inevitable conflicts in philosophy occasioned
by great changes in the economic, social,
and political life of the nation. Change
seldom occurs without an uprooting of
established principles, and in law this is
particularly troublesome.
There have been at least three notable
instances where the Court has been criti-
cized for a seeming inability to provide
the desired result. The first of these was the
Dred Scott case, 14 the decision being de-
livered at a time when the Court had
reached an unequalled popularity. The
Court determined that Dred Scott, a Negro,
14 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856).
not being a citizen, could not sue in the
United States courts and that Congress
could not prohibit slavery in the territories.
The decision prompted widespread attacks
not only on the Court but upon the integrity
of its members, and the popularity of the
Court plummeted with unbelievable sud-
denness.
Almost a half century later the Populist
tide, assisted by the farm-labor bloc and
the eastern Democrats, had been success-
ful in popularizing and procuring the en-
actment of a federal income tax. In the
Court's first decision of Pollock v. Farmer's
Loan and Trust Company,15 the act was
declared partly invalid by a divided Court.
At a rehearing during the same term of
Court, the entire act was invalidated by a
new division of the Court.1 6 This shift in
vote, added to the disappointment of the
proponents of the tax, brought the Court
and the justices under severe public attack.
Whether the Court was right or wrong is no
longer an issue, for the processes of govern-
ment have since provided for a federal in-
come tax by constitutional amendment.
For the forty years following the decision
in the Pollock case, the actions of the Court
proceeded with only minor criticism. Presi-
dent Wilson, upon the resignation of Justice
Clarke, lamented the absence of "liberal-
ism" on the Court.' 7 During the 1920's
there were a number of instances in which
federal legislation was declared unconstitu-
tional. This trend in judicial construction
reached a climax in 1935, when the deci-
sions of the Court set aside a large part of
the New Deal program of President Roose-
velt. The National Industrial Recovery Act
15 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
16 Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S.
601 (1895).
17 6 BAKER, WOODROW WILSON 117 (1937).
was nullified; 18 relief to farm debtors was
invalidated; 19 the President's removal power
was limited;20 and the definition of federal
power over interstate commerce was lim-
ited. 21 The history of the ensuing unsuccess-
ful Court-packing plan and the resolution
of the problems of the 1930's are too well
known to justify further comment or dis-
cussion. 22
Judicial Restraint
A large part of the success of the Court
in adapting itself to its role as an indepen-
dent branch of government has been its exer-
cise of judicial restraint. Without such
restraint the Court would undoubtedly
have been not only criticized, but its
powers would have been limited by con-
stitutional amendment or legislative enact-
ment. From the very beginning the Court
recognized that its power was limited by the
Constitution to "cases and controversies"
and, therefore, refused to provide advisory
opinions or declaratory judgments. 23 By
this construction the federal courts are re-
stricted to real controversies and cannot be
drawn into the legislative or administrative
process except by review of real questions
of law between opposing litigants.
Out of the first limitation, the Court has
imposed upon itself the further limitation
of not interfering with state or federal
political processes. Of course, it would be
18 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
19 Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555
(1935).
20 Humphrey v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935).
21 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
22 See JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
POWER 176-96 (1941).
23 Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792).
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impossible to regard this limitation as ab-
solute. However, the Court has refused
to pass on a number of issues having to
do with local state government and, in
some instances, federal matters which are
peculiarly within the political competence
of Congress or the President. 24
Consistent with its other self-imposed
limitations, the Court has also developed
the principle that it will not undertake to
decide questions of the constitutionality of
legislation unless the questions are properly
presented and must be determined. This
principle not only minimizes conflict with
the legislative branch, but it tends to pro-
vide a more orderly process in the disposi-
tion of cases and supplements the necessity
for restricting decisions to real questions
properly before the Court.
The final restriction which the Court has
imposed upon its power is that it will
not undertake the review of questions of
legislative policy. If the legislature has
the power, and the exercise of that power
does not infringe upon the constitutional
guarantees of an individual, there is nor-
mally nothing which the Court will review.
It is pursuant to this principle that the
Court has in many instances supported
the extension of federal power by Congress.
Without this limitation on the Court, the
system of government, with its three inde-
pendent branches, could not function.
The Business of the Court Today
A fact which is worthy of emphasis is
that the Supreme Court is not a court of
general appellate jurisdiction. As previously
suggested, the main function of the Court
is to decide cases arising under the Federal
24United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942);
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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Constitution, statutes, and treaties, and in
so doing to maintain the balance of power
as a principle of American government.
This limited jurisdiction of the Court, as
provided by the Constitution, along with
the self-imposed limitations, has tended
to keep the work of the Court within man-
ageable proportions. Even so, there have
been periods in history when legislative
changes affecting the procedures of the
Court have been necessary. The method
of reviewing admiralty and equity cases was
changed in 180325 but was amended in
1875.26 In 189127 it was finally provided
that these cases could come to the Supreme
Court only by way of certiorari.
The most notable change in the work of
the Supreme Court was brought about by
the Judiciary Act of February 13, 1925.28
That act was passed pursuant to the
Court's desire that some limitation be
placed on its jurisdiction. More than two-
thirds of the cases which the Court was
being called upon to review as a matter
of right resulted in judgments of affirmance.
The liberality of the then existing method
of invoking the Court's jurisdiction had
caused an overload which impaired the
efficient operation of its processes.
The Act of 1925 removed numerous
classes of actions from obligatory review
by appeal or writ of error and substituted
discretionary review. It also terminated re-
view as a matter of right from the Court
of Claims, from dependencies, and from
25 Act of March 3, 1803, c. 40, 2 STAT. 244.
26 Act of Feb. 16, 1875, c. 77, 18 STAT. 350.
27 Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 STAT. 826.
28 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 STAT. 936
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For
complete discussion see Frankfurter and Landis,
The Supreme Court Under The Judiciary Act Of
1925, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1928).
the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
This legislative change brought about
a more orderly administration of the Court's
business. By the end of the 1929 Term the
backlog of work had been cleaned up and
ever since that date the work of the Court
has been kept current. The only cases
carried over are those in which review was
granted too late in the term for argument
and a few cases set for reargument for
various reasons.
In sheer volume of work the business of
the Court has increased by rapid progres-
sion. When John Marshall became Chief
Justice he was confronted with ten cases
in his first year. During the ensuing five
years there were but 120 cases filed and
by 1830 the average number of cases filed
each term was but fifty-eight. The total
number of cases docketed in the first forty
years of the Court's operation did not equal
the number fied in the 1956 Term. With
the termination of each war there have
been substantial increases in the business
brought to the Court. In the 1938 Term
prior to World War II there were 1,007
cases docketed and 922 disposed of by
action of the Court. In the 1956 Term there
were 1,802 cases docketed and 1,670 dis-
posed of by action of the Court. Each
succeeding term of Court brings an increase
in the number of cases docketed and dis-
posed of.
Many of the cases brought to the Su-
preme Court are frivolous and are pre-
sented without any reasonable expectation
of successfully invoking the Court's juris-
diction. This has long been a matter of
concern as indicated by a statement made
in 1934 by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:
I think that it is safe to say that about 60
percent of the applications for certiorari are
wholly without merit and ought never to
have been made. There are probably about
20 percent or so in addition which have a
fair degree of plausibility but which fail to
survive critical examination. The remainder
falling short, I believe, of 20 percent, show
substantial grounds and are granted.2 9
The accuracy of this statement has been
borne out by each term of Court and is no
less true even today. Of the 803 petitions
for certiorari not in forma pauperis car-
ried on the appellate docket which were
acted on in the 1956 Term, 139, or 17.3
per cent, were granted. On the miscellane-
ous docket the number of petitions for cer-
tiorari acted upon number 622 of which
thirty-eight, or 6.1 per cent, were granted.
These figures indicate that a substantial
amount of the Court's time is consumed by
frivolous petitions which should never be
presented to the Court.
While changes have been taking place
in the procedural aspects of the Supreme
Court business, there have also been sig-
nificant changes in the nature of the sub-
stantive business of the Court. The two are
not entirely unrelated and to a large degree
may be traceable to an increase in federal
legislation over the past quarter century.
There has most definitely been a substan-
tial shift from general common-law matters
to the litigation of matters in the public
law domain. In the 1930 Term, of the ninety-
five petitions for certiorari in common-law
cases, ten were granted. In the 1955 Term,
of the fifty-two petitions for certiorari in
common-law cases, only one was granted.
The changing nature of litigation before
the Court only reflects the changing pattern
of our national political, economic and
social life.
29Hughes, Address to the ALl, 20 A.B.A.J. 341
(1934).
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The public law nature of the business
of the Court is further reflected in the fact
that of the 145 cases argued before the
Court during the 1956 Term, the Govern-
ment participated in ninety-two. The Gov-
ernment was petitioner or appellant in
thirty cases; it was respondent or appellee in
sixty cases; and it appeared as amicus curiae
in two cases. The statistics, published in the
annual report of the Solicitor General in-
dicate that the Government participated in
37 per cent of all cases docketed, and in
64 per cent of all cases argued.
Conclusion
A survey of the operation of the Supreme
Court in constitutional government neces-
sarily reflects its growth and adaptation to
serve the changing needs of an expanding
nation. One of the virtues of the American
system is its flexibility and adaptability to
changing needs. To understand the many
refinements in the operation of our system
it is necessary to evaluate the political, so-
cial, and economic pressures of the various
periods of American history. American
constitutional law has mirrored the needs
of a developing social order. Over the past
170 years the scope of federal powers has
changed to meet new problems created by
technological advances, an expanding econ-
omy, and a growing population. While the
concept of federal powers has changed, the
Constitution has remained virtually the
same with the important exception of the
fourteenth amendment which imposes
additional limitations on state action.
Throughout all of the changes which have
transpired, the Supreme Court has carried
out a significant role in the resolution of
conflicts in our federal system and is well
recognized as an indispensable third branch
of government.
